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I!l 'C'P.E SUPRE"!B CIJUT<T 0"' TllE STATf: 'iF' UTAH 
RU-;ISTI:n.cD !:'EYSICAL 
Tl!E'U\P I S':'S, I:'C. , a 
Utah corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Res?ondent, 
!(OBERT !~. JEPSOJJ, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
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Case '!o. 15395 
B'l.IEP OF R!.SDr:r:mE:!TS 
STATE'IENT Or 'i'Hr: [F\'l''JRf: OF THE CASB 
This is an action brought by Registered Physical 
Therapists for dar1ages for breacl-t of a fiouciar" duty and for 
destruction of its business arising out of T(ohert K. Jepson's 
nalicious and intentional acts. 
DI SPOSI'rii)c! I'l TJ!E L0\7ET( COU 0 .T 
Beginning on '·lav 26th, 1977, this case lvns tried 1·1ithout 
a jury before the Honorable non V. Tibbs. The LoHer r:ourt l"ound 
t'lnt an cm!'lo;'er-el'1nlovc:>e relationshin existed bet~>reen respondent, 
Re0istercd P~ysical 'C'he~apists (RPm) and appellant, Robert ~. 
JeJ~on (Jenson), under an e1'1nloyr1ent agreerent and that Jepson 
not onl~· breached se1id agreerent but also breacherl his fiduciarv 
duties e1s e1n cl'1plo'/CL' .-.nd "laliciuusly and intentionally converted 
~nd/nr destroyed ~PT's !'ersnnal pronertv and nhysical therany 
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business. Jud'}ment including punitive damages was grantee 
against Jespon totalling a value of $'32,315.00. '"~.PT was a: .. 
awarded as additional punitive damages all credits and of:,: 
due to Jepson from RPT. 
RELIEF S0UGHT 0~ APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the finf.ings and 
conclusions of the Lower Court and the judgment therein, 
- 2-
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ST_l\.TI::MENT OF FACTS 
A. Rule 75 (p) (2) Statement. 
Appellant, Jepson, has set forth in its brief a state-
ment of facts. In compliance with Rule 75 (p} (2), respondent, 
RPT, indicates below to what extent appellant's statement is 
inconsistent with the facts. 
1. Respondent agrees with ~ost of appellants first 
and second paragraphs on page 2; however, there was a specific 
verbal employment agreement that contained specific terms which 
are hereinafter stated in respondent's statement of facts. 
2. Respondent agrees with most of a~pellant's third 
paragraph on page 2 except a~pellant failed to mention that he 
advised RPT in November 1975 not only that he was terminating 
but that he was going to keep all the equipment (Exhibit PL 13, 
TR 105~ As a response to Jepson's notification, Don Vernon and 
Larry Brown, officers of RPT, Hent to Richfield on December 9, 
1975, to mal:e preparations to continue their physical therapy 
business and secure the personal property of' RP':'. ('!.'R 106) 
It was only after Vernon and BroHn discovered that Jepson had 
removed all important and necessary information and documents 
needed to continue ~PT's business in Richfield that they secured 
their equipment. (TR 107-110, 113) RPT did not permanently 
close their Richfiel~ business or bank account at that time. 
( TR 11 () , 112- 114 & 15 4 ) 
3. Appellant's fourth paragraph of his statement of 
-3-
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facts appearing on page 3 is correct except for the additional 
fact stated by Don Vernon that if the equip~ent brought ba: 
the off ice could be operated tl b f 1e same as e ore. (Tr 154) 
4. Appellant's fifth and sixth paragraphs of his sta:. 
ment of facts appearing on pages 3 and 4 are somev1hat correct, 
however, all of Jepson's efforts were done as an employee of 
RPT and it was only with the financial assistance of RPT that 
any good will was acquired. (Tr 317) 
B. Respondent's Statement of Facts. 
l. Jepson was employed by RPT from August 1973 throu:, 
December 9, 1975, to conduct and operate '{I'T's physical thera~ 
business in Richfield, Utah, (Findings No. 1, Tr 57) 
2. The terms of the employment agreement were as foL 
a. That plaintiff would provide all of the finaociM 
and pay for all expenses to establish a physical therapy busi· 
in Richfield, Utah. (Tr 60-63, Exhibit PL-13, Findings ~lo. 
b. That the plaintiff would pay for all expenses 
incurred by the Richfield operation until sufficient funds,.,,~ 
deposited in the Richfield checking account fran services ~e~· 
formed in Richfield to pay for said expP.nses. (Tr 60-63, r:x>:. 
PL-13, Findings i'lo. 2 (b) ) 
c. That defendant Hould receive a beginning salar;·: 
· and further recei"' $700.00 to manage the Richfield operat1on 
costs of living increases in said salary. (Tr 57-59, Findi' 
2 (c) 
-4-
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d. That defendant would receive, to begin with, 10% 
of the net profit generated by the ~ichfield operation and that 
said percentage would increase by 5% increments every quarter 
until defendant's share of the profits reached 50%. (Tr 65-70, 
Findings No. 2 (d) 
e. That 10% of the gross income placed on the books of 
the Richfield operation would go to plaintif~'s corporation for 
development of corporate business. (Tr 65-66, Findings :~o. 2 
(e) ) 
f. That on the sales of all items from the Richfield 
operation including corsets and appliances defendant would 
receive 70% of the net profit plus 20% in the event said items 
were not purchased through an independent jobber and plaintiff 
would receive 10% of the net profit on all sales. (Tr 73-74, 
Findings no. 2 (f) ) 
g. That plaintiff would furnish all of the initial 
equipment to begin the physical therapy business in ~ichfield, 
Utah. Tr 61, Findings No. 2 (g) ) 
3. RPT fully performed under all of the terms of said 
agreement but Jepson breached said agreement as follo~TS: 
a. Paid to himself RPT's share of the profits from 
sales of items in Richfield. (Findings No. 5, Tr 86-87) 
b. Used corporate funds for his own personal use. 
(Findings No. 6, Tr 90-92) 
c. l~ithdrew monies from RPT's account for profit sharing 
in excess of Jespon's share (Exhibit PL-12, Tr 73) 
-5-
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4. On November 26, 1975, Jepson notified RPT that 
was terminating his employment and keeping RPT's equ· 
· ' lpment :·-
himself. (Exhibit PL-18) I 
5. On December 9,1975, Vernon and Brown, officers:' 
RPT, went to Richfield to straighten out the problem of the 
equipment and if necessarv run RP~'s office in ~ichfield. 
6. RPT was unable to continue its physical therapy 
business in Richfield (Tr 110) for the reason that Jepson ha: 
1 
not only breached his fiduciary duty as an employee, but als: 
had destroyed RPT' s business by comrni tting the following ~aL· 
cious and intentional acts: (Findin<Js No. 9) 
a. Destroyed or converted to his own use active tres· 
ment cards and other materials containing confidential in(or 
tion about 'l.PT's customers. (Tr 108-110, 113) 
b. Ot)ened his own checking account and deposited FY 
monies therein. (Tr 26-27) 
c. Prior to his termination date he kept RPT's con· 
fidential information, to-wit, treatment cards, accounts 
receivables, daily worksheets and transferred said confide:.:. 
information to his own treament cards. Shortly thereafter 
destroyed ~PT's materials; collect )7,999.00 of '1.PT's accw· 
receivables and converted said money to his own use; kept 
other accounts receivables of RPT; and solicited and contir. .. 
to treat custoners of ::PT. (Tr 28-3~, 278-279, r:xhibit D·l' 
D-31) 
-6-
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7. Jepson converted all of RPT's physical therapy 
business in Richfield, Utah to h;s b · 
• own us~ness and subsequently 
grossed $60,000 in 1976 from said business. (Findings No. 13, 
Tr 35-36) 
B. In approximately February, 1976, RPT finally decided 
that they could not continue their business in Richfield due to 
the loss of necessary information to Jepson and the head start 
he received to solicit patients of RPT. (Tr 113-114) 
9. The RPT's Richfield physical therapy business had 
earned the following net profits: 
1974 - $6,945.32 (Exhibit D-26) 
1975- $1,748.45 (Exhibit D-27, PL-12 
(Does not include December) 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL FOR LEGAL RELIEF LI'UTS THIS COURTS 
SCOPE OF ti.EVIEW. 
It is a well settled law in Utah that this court, in 
cases at law tried before the court without a jury, 1vill only 
examine evidence as is necessary to determine question of law. 
Further, this court will not pass upon the sufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the findings or lUdgment, or substitute 
another evalutation of the evidence, unless there is no 
legitimate proof to support the findings or judgmnet. In 
no cases at law, either with or without a jury, will this 
-7-
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court determine questions of fact, but may in enul·ty 
., cases. 
Lyman v. Town of Price, 63 Utah 90, 222 P. 599; Sine 11 
Salt Lake Transoort Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P. 2d 875; Pixto~ 
-Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P. 2d 408; and Article VIII section, 
of Utah Constitution. 
Since under Utah law both actions at law and actions. 
equity can be consolidated in one action it is sometiMes dif:. 
cult to ascertain whether the case on appeal is one of equit; 
or law. Such is not the case here for it is clearly evid~~ 
that the relief sought on ap':)eal by a!:)pellant is legal relie' 
from damages awarded for a breach of fiduciarv duty and desc: 
tion of respondent's business. Respondent did not seek eqUJ~ 
relief in the lower court and appellant does not seek it in t'. 
court. Further, the distinction as to whether leoal relief 
sought rather than equitable is mentioned in 27 Am Jur 2d S' 
112 at page 637 where it states: 
" .•. That the suit is held to be judicable at law, 
and not in equity, where the purpose thereof is t~ 
recoverv of da.'11ages which have been sustained bv 
reason of fraud' a fraudulent conspiracy or a breac. 
of a fiduciary duty." 
(See also ~'11bler v. Choteau, 107 us 586, 27 L ed 322, S ct 
556 and Koeon v. Corpeiro, 200 A2d 708.) 
Appellant is seeking relief from damages sustainec: 
a breaci1 of a fiduciary duty and this kind of relief is clec' 
legal relief and as such linits the scope of revie1>1 on o?s:: 
by this court. 
-3-
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Appellant presents two issues to this court. 0ne is 
whether the lower court's award of $10,000 was in conforMity 
with its findings. The other issue is \olhether there was any 
legitimate evidence to support the figure of $10,000. This 
court is not required to review the evidence and make its 
inferences therefrom, however, respondent submits that the 
evidence and the inferences therefrom clearly support the 
findings and the lower court's judgment \~hich was in conformity 
with its findings and should not be disturbed. ("lason v. 'lason, 
160 P. 2d 730 [1945)) 
POINT II 
THE 11.r·IARD OF DN-ti\GES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS i·IAS Hl COCl-
FORrliTY \liTH THE TRIAL COURT'S Fii<DING THAT JEPSON BB.EACHF.D HIS 
F IDUC LII.RY DUTIES AS AC-1 EHPL0YEE OF RPT. 
Appellant urges upon this court the argument that since 
there was no written agreement between Jepson and RPT an award 
for loss of business could not he founded in contract. However, 
some courts have read into the ~~ploYMent at will at least a 
contractual obligation to perform services for the best interest 
of the employer and that where a key employee acts to the detriment 
of his ~~player prior to the tine that he terminates gives rise 
to a cause of action founded upon breach of fiduciary duty. This 
fiduciary duty arises out of the e~~loyer-employee relationship 
and is present in all employment contracts whether .,.,ritten or 
oral as an implied covenant. Concerning this duty the court 
stated in C.E.I.R., Inc. v. CoMputer DynaMics Corn., 229 M.D. 
-9-
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357, 183 A. 2d 374 at 380, "that any breach f o an employee', 
fiduciary duty to the employer will entitle the employer to 
an accounting in equity for the fruits of the wrongful actic· 
Further, in Restatement of Aaency it clearly s~~s: 
in an employer-employee relationship: 
" ••• after the termination of the agency, unless 
otherwise agreed, the agent has no duty not to 
compete with the principal; however, during t~e 
continuance of the agencv, an agent has a duty not :: 
to do disloyal acts looking to future cor.1petition .. : 
Restatement of Agencv 2d §396, Comment: (a) 
The court in State Export Co. v. 11ol Shioping > Tnc. 
155 NY S 2d 188, also stated a similar rule of law: 
" ..• a former employee is not free to exploit the 
trade of his former employer if the op~ortunity 
is facilitated by acts of preparation and dis-
loyalty during his employment and before resig-
nation, and by the breach of his obligation to use 
his best efforts in the interest of the employer; 
and that if the opportunity acquired after resig-
nation is the opportunity lost to the employer 
because of disloyal acts done during the emplo]'ll\ent, 
the loss is actionable." 
It is not necessary to argue that Jepson's oral 
employment contract contained an implied covenant of loyal:· 
and good faith for the law is clear that a fiduciarv duty 
and a breach of this duty is actionable whether it is clas':' 
in contract or tort. 
The lower court found numerous disloyal acts done:· 
tionally and maliciously by Jepson looking to future com~e:: 
-10-
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The opportunity of treating patients in Richfield that Jepson 
received and RPT lost was a direct result of J • d' 1 epson s ~s oyal 
acts while employed. All of the information necessary for the 
operation of the Richfield business belonged to RPT and the 
destruction and conversion of said information by Jepson was 
not only an actionable wrong as a breach of his fiduciary duty 
but the proximate cause of the damages suffered by RPT. 
Numerous cases have awarded damages for similar breaches of 
fiduciary duties. (28 ALR 3d § 24, p. 120) 
The critical factor for which damages have been awarded 
has been the existence of intentional acts committed by employees 
while still employed, looking for future competition, that were 
not consistent with the employees obligation to exercise the 
utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of their duties. 
A case on point is Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc., v. Hall, 18 
Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1969) where officers, while still 
employed by the corporation,committed acts to secure and solicit 
customers of the corporation for their new and com~eting business. 
This court stated that a duty of loyalty is required of officers 
(employees) and then cited with approval Duane Jones Comoany, 
Inc. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E. 2d 237 (1954) where, in a 
similar set of facts, the court also awarded damages for lost 
profits. Although the acts of the defendants in these two 
cases are somewhat different than the acts of Jepson in the 
present case many similarities exist. The major similarity is 
-11-
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the result obtained. The court in Duane Jones, supra, p.): 
stated as follows: 
" ... that the individual defendants-appellants , 
employees of plaintiff corporation, determined' u~;: 
a course of conduct which, when subsecruently c~r~ 1 , o~t, resulted 1n benefit to themselves through~~ 
t1on of plaintiff's business, in violation of t~e 
fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing ir: 
on defendants by their close relationship with pla .. 
corporation." 
Appellant further attempts to argue that if the fou:. 
for the award of dama0es cannot be squeezed into contract: 
only has one alternative left and that is the tort of taki: 
customer list which constitutes a trade secret. By attemc: 
to limit the alternatives appellant hopes to dismiss his L 
However, the law allows other alternatives, as mention~~ 
and the finding by the lower court of Jepson's breach of a 
fiduciary duty would be sufficient to support an award o!~ 
for loss of business. 
Hot only can the lower court's award of damages :c 
loss of business be founded in contract and agency law as 
mentioned above but a strong position can be presented for 
foundation in tort law based upon the taking of confiden:: 
information. Respondent agrees with the cases cited in 
appellant's brief and the fact that Jepson had the right~ 
compete and solicit custor1ers or patients of P.PT after Je;' 
termination as an employee. The tortious destructions o'. 
-12-
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business was not caused solely by the subsequent competition 
and solicitation by Jepson, but the malicious acts done prior 
to termination that rendered PYT incapable of competing at all. 
Jepson was under a fiduciary obligation to conduct himself so 
as to not cause injuries to RPT, and not to take documents and 
information belonging to RPT. 
Appellant in his brief stresses the fact that most 
courts do not protect customer names and addresses unless they 
are considered confidential information. However, in none of 
the cases cited by appellant has a court condoned or allowed 
the taking of personal property of the em?loyer Hhich contained 
information necessary for the employer to conduct its business. 
An excellent case on point is Southern California Disinfecting 
Co. v. Lamkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal Rptr. 43 (1960), 
where the defendant while employed as a route salesman removed 
from a route book sheets containing information on plaintiff's 
customers. The defendant replaced the sheets taken with blank 
sheets and then after his termination used the infomation on 
the sheets taken to solicit customers of the plaintiff before 
plaintiff could again acquire the lost information necessary 
to deal with its customers. The court held that such conduct 
by Lamkin amounted to "stealthy connivance to pirate business 
unfairly" and awarded danages for loss of business and punitive 
damages. The court also held that the information taY.en was 
confidential information. 
Another case is Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 29 RI 399, 
-13-
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71 A 802, where an employee who examined eyes and prescribe-: 
glasses for patrons of the employer copied names and addreso' 
of customers from the records of the employer prior to leavi: 
and then used said information to solicit their business fm 
himself. The court rejected the argument that copying and 
using only those names of customers that the employee had 
personally exar:1ined was not a breach of confidence, and fur: 
stated that an employee has no more right to copy records ma' 
by himself for the employer than to copy other records~~ 
he had access. 
In the present case Jepson 1 s acts of taking of the t:• 
ment cards and other information and transferring said info:r' 
tion to his own cards and then destroying RPT's cardswere~ 
acts from which daf'lages flow. Jepson's acts were a rnalicio: 
effort to interfere with and destroy RPT 1 s business thus !'lJ ~ 
it easier for Jepson to compete and acquire RPT' s business. 
This court would be hard pressed to find a better exarn?le s' 
disloylty and breach of a fiduciary duty, unfair cornt)etitic: 
and tortious taking of confidential information. 
POINT III 
THERE TvAS ~10R!. THAN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEF'OP.I: THE 
TRIAL COURT TO SUPPORT THE AWAP.~ IN THE SUM OF SlO,OOO r~ 
PLAINTIFF'S LOSS OF BUSINESS. 
It is well settled law that damaqes can be award~-
loss of business. The main problem that has a:Jpeared in rc· 
cases, however, is how to measure the d~ages for 
-14-
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Sqid loss of business. In 25 CJS, Damages, section 90, it 
states: 
"Where your regular and established business is 
injured, interrupted or destroyed the measure of 
damages is the diminution in value of the business 
by reason of the wrongful act, with interest; it is 
the net loss, and not diminution in gross income. 
In order to establish the diminution in value, it 
is necessary, or proper to show the usual, or past, 
profits from the business." 
It appears then, that the law suggests that the loss of 
future profits from a regularly established business may in 
proper cases be established by showing that the profits after 
the wrong were less than past profits. 
It is evident that RP'!'' s business in Richfield, Utah ~ras 
a regular and established business. There is also no contention 
with the fact that the value of RP'l'' s Richfield business ~ras 
diminished to zero subsequent to Jepson's malicious and 
intentional acts. Further, the lower court found that said 
acts of Jepson were the specific cause of the injury to and 
the destruction of RPT' s business .in Richfield. Therefore, the 
only issue before this court in regards to the award of $10,000 
is whether the trial court had sufficient evidence before it 
to determine the value of RPT's Richfield business prior to its 
destruction by Jepson. 
The lower court had the following evidence before it to 
establish the value of RPT's business in Richfield: 
1. The testimony of Don Vernon who was the president 
-15-
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and major stockholder of RPT and the best qualified person 
to know the value of said business. He indicated that t~ 
of said business was Fifty Thousand Dollars (Tr 131). !!is d', 
mination of said value was based upon the actual profit str. 
ture of said business during the three years ::,Jrior to its d', 
tion, the amount of accounts receivable (placed in evide~e 
and Mr. Vernon 1 s own personal involvement with said busineo' 
2. The testimony of Robert Cameron, ?.PT 1 s accounk 
who prepared all financial statements showing the profit or. 
loss status of the Richfield business for the time peri~ 
involved. 
3. The testimony of the defendant, Jepsor, who ind::: 
that with essentially the same patients and referrals the L1 
he took from RPT grossed $60,000 the following year. 
4. The best evidence before the trial court ';as 
Exhibits D- 2 6, D- 27 and PL-12 which indica ted the exact an: 
of profit earned by the subject business during the three:-
period ~rior to its destruction. 
The aforesaid exhibits indicate that "PT made a ne: 
profit in 1974 and 1975 of approximatelv $9,000.00, and 3 
- 1 <;"O 000 00 The net profit gross profit of approxFnate y , ' , • . 
is less than actual due to the unauthorized expenses incurr: 
by Je~son. 
from the record that the lmver cou:: It is apparent 
had before it all of the available evidence as 
to the vale: 
-16-
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PYT's business in Richfield. Said evidence established a 
value a lot higher than $2,000.00 per year, but under the 
general rule in the majority of the jurisdictions the trier 
of the fact is not required to mathematical exactness in the 
amount but only a reasonable approximation based upon the 
evidence. In U.S. v. Griffith, 210 F 2d 11, the Tenth Circuit 
Court stated that 
" ... althouqh persoective profits are somewhat uncertain 
and problematical, in cases where damages are definitely 
attributable to the wrong of the defendant and are only 
uncertain as to amount, they will not te denied even 
though they are difficult of ascertainment." 
RPT contends that its prosepctive profits are not that uncertain 
based upon the past performance of its business. The court goes 
on to state that in order for the trial court to reach a 
reasonable approximation of future damages that have been lost 
it must have such facts and circumstances before it to enable 
it to make an estimate of damage based upon judgment not guess 
work. In the present case the trial court hau all the available 
facts and circumstances upon which to make a reasonable approxi-
mation of the loss suffered by RPT due to the destruction of 
their business. The lower court did not use guess work to 
arrive at the figure of 52,000.00 per year for the next five 
years as the value of the lost business. This figure represents 
the lowest amount of net profit made in Richfield by RPT during 
any one year and does not include any value for good will or 
accounts receivable lost. It is interesting to note that ~r. 
-17-
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Vernon, based his estimate of the value of RPT' b · s USJ.ness on 
five year basis of $6,000.00 n ~ 
. er year .cor a total of $30,0o0. 
(Tr 131) 
This court in Gould v. Mt. States Telephone and ':'elec: 
309 p. 2d 802, 6 Utah 2nd 187 stated the true rule on the sut· 
of determining damages from lost ?rof its. This court stated. 
page 806 as follov1s: 
"Shall the injured party be allowed to recover no 
damages (or merelv no!Tlinal), because he cannot sh011 
the exact amount with certainty, thou<Jh he is readv 
to show to the satisfaction of the jury, that he has 
suffered large da"laqes bv the injury? Certaintv, it 
is true, would lee thus attained; but it would be t~e 
certainty of injustice. * * *Juries are allowed to ac: 
upon probable and inferential as well as direct anct 
positive proof. 1\nd 1-1hen, from the nature of t!1eca•· 
the amount of the da!Clages cannot be estimated 1-1ith 
certainty * * * 11e can see no objection to olacing 
before the jury all the facts and circurnstances oft:. 
case having any tendencv to show dal'lages, or their 
orobable amount, so as to enable them to nake them~· 
intelligible and ;-:>robable estiMate which the nature: 
the case will admit." 
RPT contends that the lower court had all of the facts a~ 
circumstances and made an intelligable and probable estiPate 
as to the a!"'1ount of dal"'1a<Jes RPT suffered due to the destruc: 
of their phvsical thera;-:>y business in ~ichfield, Utah. 
Another case on :'oint is Vickers v. ''iichita ~ 
Univ. 518 P 2d 512, 213 Kansas 614, Hhere the court stated'' 
follOI'IS: 
"unouestionabl'l the met'"lod of establishing the los' 
nrofits with r~ason&ble certaintv is shm·!ing a his:c: 
~f nast o~ofit ability. Past nrofit al:ili~'l of~~: 
ulai:- business is not, ho'·Jever, the onl:' :11ethod o: t'·· 
lost future ;:->rofit. 'The evJ.dence necess->rv J.n es · 
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~uture profits with reasonable certainty must depend 
ln a_large measure upon the circumstances of a 
partlcular case ... _absolute certainty in proving loss 
of future prof1ts 1s not required ... " 
In the Vickers case the court reversed a lower court 
decision to restrict the evidence of the plaintiff to past 
business experience for the purpose of showing loss of profit 
and allowed additional evidence as to what future ~rofits might 
have been. In the present case future profits can be and were 
determined solely upon the past business experience of RPT. 
This court made an i!"lportant point in the Gould case 
where it stated th3.tthe rule againstthe recovery of uncertain 
damages is generally directed against uncertainty with respect 
to cause rather than to ~easure or extent. The lower court found 
in the present case that there was no uncertainty as to the 
cause of RPT's damage. Their loss of business was directly 
caused by the malicious and intentional acts of Jepson. Appel-
lant argues that RPT should be denied recovery of damages for 
loss of profit based solely on the uncertainty with respect 
to the measure or extent of damages. As was previously !"lentioned, 
in regards to the measure or extent of damages, this court and 
other courts have stated that mathematical exactness as to 
the amount of damages is not required but only that the evidence 
formed a basis for a reasonable approximation by the trier of 
fact. Respondent submits that the lower court had all the 
necessary evidence and made a reasonable approximation of the 
-19-
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damages incurred bv ~P~ as a result of Je_nson 1 
- '- estroving 
business. 
One final point is that t11e lower court's a\Jard of 
$2,000 per year seer1s to be based on net earnings and not 
gross earnings. RP~ contends that said a1-1arc1. could h1 •1e 
been based on gross earnings of a:.:>proxiTT\atel•J $30,no0.00 
per year. This court in the !1oc;an case, ~ at p. 92, 
stated in regard to ascertaining the value of loss of 
business: 
"A year's earnings, gross or net, cannot deter'1ine 
dar1ages where agents solicit others to take the~ 
business a\vay fror1 their princinals in favor of sue' 
agents, other"'ise agents eTT\::>lO'fed in a pri'1cionl's 
banner year Might desiqnec1ly Pied Piper the custo:F 
pay the profit for the past ye.ar, intenning to enjo: 
a handsome re,vard for n'l.nv vears to coJYle, --a rathc~ 
ffiOUSY gesture UpOn IJhich COUrts frown." 
The lower court was not bound to calculate the danaqe ~ 
RPT on net earnings and its deterl'lina tion of the af'\ounts 
of $10,000.00 was not only extrenely conservative in 
comparison to RPT' s gross ear nin<J s l::u t also a su:Jer harq: .. 
for the $GO,OOO.OO business that Je,Json a.cr;uirecl. 
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SU!1!1ARY 
The present case is a case at law. The lower court 
evaluated the evidence and made its findings. From those 
findings it concluded that Jepson destroved RPT's physical 
therapy business in Richfield through malicious and intentional 
acts that were a breach of his fiduciarv duty. 
The lower court had at least the three following 
alternatives upon which to base its a1~ard of damages for loss 
of profit: 
l. A breach of contract and fiduciary duty while an 
employee. 
2. The unla•,Jful conversion and tortious taking of 
confidential information and materials. 
3. The intentional destruction of RP~'s business 
through unfair competition. 
The case lav1 clearly supports the al'lard of damages for loss of 
business when the lower court finds that t~e defendant's acts 
were the proximate cause of said loss. In the present case, 
the lower cour had more than sufficient evidence before it to 
support its findings of a breach of a fiduciary duty and 
judgment of $10,000 for loss of business. 
It is also clear from the record that the lower court 
had before it all of the financial data of RPT's Richfield 
Business for the period in ouestion and from said data made 
a reasonable approxi!T1ation of the damages suffered due to 
-21-
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RPT's loss of business. The law does not reouire anything 
more. The judgment of the lo~er court should he affir~~. 
Resoectfull:; subnitted 
RICENW S. ;m·•.SLIJI 
455 East Fourth South 
Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Responde:· 
CERTIFIC~~E OF !niLING 
I hereb:/ certify that on the /$" day of February, 1978, 
two CO!'yies of the I·Ji thin and foregoing Brief of Res"ondent, 
Registered Physical Therapists, Inc., were served unon 
Appellant by "1ailing to its attorney, 'l'ex R. Olsen, Attorne:· 
at Law, 76 South ''uin Richfield, Utah, 84701. 
0 3JJ)CA)L ~Chin\d S. ilenelka 
AttorneY for Ap~ellant 
Registered Physical 'Chera:: 
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